The controlled declassification of secrets has received much attention in research on information-flow security, though mostly for sequential programming languages. In this article, we aim at guaranteeing the security of concurrent programs. We propose the novel security property WHAT&WHERE that allows one to limit what information may be declassified where in a program. We show that our property provides adequate security guarantees independent of the scheduling algorithm (which is non-trivial due to the refinement paradox) and present a security type system that reliably enforces the property. In a second scheduler-independence result, we show that an earlier proposed security condition is adequate for the same range of schedulers. These are the first scheduler-independence results in the presence of declassification.
Introduction
When giving a program access to secrets, one would like to know that the program does not leak them to untrusted sinks. Such a confidentiality requirement can be formalized by information-flow properties like, e.g., noninterference [12] .
Noninterference-like properties require that a program's output to untrusted sinks is independent of secrets. Such a lack of dependence obviously ensures that public outputs do not reveal any secrets. While being an adequate characterization of confidentiality, the requirement is often too restrictive. The desired functionality of a program might inherently require some correlation between secrets and public output. Examples are password-based authentication mechanisms (a response to an authentication attempt depends on the secret password), encryption algorithms (a cipher-text depends on the secret plain-text), and online stores (electronic goods shall be kept secret until they have been ordered).
Hence, it is necessary to relax noninterference-like properties such that a deliberate release of some secret information becomes possible. While this desire has existed since the early days of research on information-flow control (e.g. in the Bell/La Padula Model secrets can be released by so called trusted processes [8]), solutions for controlling declassification are just about to achieve a satisfactory level of maturity (see [33] for an overview). However, research on declassification has mostly focused on sequential programs so far, while controlling declassification in multi-threaded programs is not yet equally well understood.
Generalizing definitions of information-flow security for sequential programs to security properties that are suitable for concurrent systems is known to be nontrivial. Already in the eighties, Sutherland [34] and McCullough [23] proposed noninterference-like properties for distributed systems. These were first steps in a still ongoing exploration of sensible definitions of information-flow security [19] . The information-flow security of multi-threaded programs, on which we focus in this article, is also non-trivial. Due to the refinement paradox [14] , the scheduling of threads requires special attention. In particular, it does not suffice to simply assume a possibilistic scheduler, because a program might have secure information-flow if executed with the fictitious possibilistic scheduler, but be insecure if executed, e.g., with a Round-Robin or uniform scheduler.
Our first main contribution is the formal definition of two schemas for noninterference-like properties for multi-threaded programs. Our schemas WHAT s and WHAT&WHERE s are parametric in a scheduler model s. Both schemas can be used to capture confidentiality requirements, but they differ in how declassification is controlled. If the scheduler is known then s can be specified concretely and, after instantiating one of our schemas with s, one obtains a property that adequately captures information-flow security for this scheduler.
However, often the concrete scheduler is not known in advance. While, in principle, one could leave the scheduler parametric and use, e.g., ∀s.WHAT s as security condition, such a universal quantification over all possible schedulers is rather inconvenient, in program analysis as well as in program construction. Fortunately, an explicit universal quantification over schedulers can be avoided.
Our second main contribution is the definition of a novel security condition WHAT&WHERE and a scheduler-independence result, which shows that WHAT&WHERE implies WHAT&WHERE s for all possible scheduler models s. A compositionality result shows that our novel property is compatible with compositional reasoning about security. Based on this result, we derive a security type system for verifying our novel security property efficiently.
Our third main contribution is a scheduler-independence result showing that our previously proposed property WHAT 1 [20] implies WHAT s for all s.
Previous scheduler-independence results were limited to information-flow properties that forbid declassification (e.g. [31,36,22] ). With this article, we close this gap by developing the first scheduler-independence results for informationflow properties that support controlled declassification. Scheduler independence provides the basis for verifying security without knowing the scheduler under which a program will be run. Our scheduler-independence results also reduce the conceptual complexity of constructing secure programs. They free the developer from having to consider concrete schedulers when reasoning about security.
Proofs of all theorems in this article are available on the authors' web-pages.
Preliminaries

Multi-threaded Programs
Multi-threaded programs perform computations in concurrent threads that can communicate with each other, e.g. via shared memory. When the number of threads exceeds the number of available processing units, scheduling becomes necessary. Usually, the schedule for running threads is determined dynamically
